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Abstract This elaboration will explore the epistemology of
futures studies. To address this, first the logi-cal ground of
epistemology has to be examined, i.e., the laws of thought
and in connection to that, the mere possibility of justified true
beliefs about the future. After a short introduction to the con-
cept of justified true beliefs, the distinction between
internalism and externalism will be observed. Then, two ap-
proaches of justification will be explained and compared.
Thereafter, the structure of knowledge has to be looked at
and the distinction between foundationalism and coherentism
will be illustrated. To conclude, the logical ground, the laws of
thought, grants the possibility of justified true beliefs about the
future, because the third law states that unam-biguous as-
sumptions concerning the future can only be true or false but
not undefined. Re-garding the distinction of internalsim and
externalism, it is epistemically reasonable to favor internalism
over externalism, because not only is it impossible to refer to
the future externally but the internal approach concerning the
accessibility of justification is a preferable way to justify be-
liefs about the future. Relating to the structure of knowledge,
foundationalism is a better choice than coherentism, because it
is a robust answer to the regress problem and moreover, a
stable initial position is needed to justify beliefs about the
future.
Keywords Epistemology . Futures studies . Internalism .
Externalism . Foundationalism . Coherentism
Introduction
Futures studies, as a scientific discipline, are not very long
standing but have a promising future. This is because not only
corporations but also governments are interested in orienta-
tional knowledge concerning the future. However, there is
much to improve regarding a plausible and consistent theoret-
ical foundation. This paper will look at the epistemology of
futures studies, which is a small step on the way towards a
theoretical ground for futures studies. To address this, the
logical ground of epistemology has to be examined first, i.e.,
the laws of thought, and in this context, the mere possibility of
justified true beliefs about the future. After a short introduc-
tion to the concept of justified true beliefs, the distinction
between internalism and externalism will be discussed. Then,
two approaches of justification will be explained and com-
pared. Thereafter, the structure of knowledge will be looked
at, and the distinction between foundationalism and
coherentism will be illustrated. Finally, the question if there
is a possibility of justified true beliefs about the future and if
internal foundationalism is a preferable theory concerning the
epistemology of futures studies will be answered.
Introducing: justified true beliefs about the future
When we think of the concept of knowledge, it is hard to stay
focused on that concept as it seems to blur in the face of a
thorough investigation. In the history of philosophy, since
Plato, justified true beliefs are the relational equivalent to
knowledge [1, 2]. Although there exist sound arguments
against this understanding of knowledge,1 it remains
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dominant but the main focus concerning knowledge is the
justification of beliefs. However, can there be justified true
beliefs about the future? Ryne Byerly believes that:
BWe make decisions on the basis of beliefs about the
future daily. I believe that tomorrow so-and-so will be
in the office, that my Internet will be working, et cetera.
Often, such beliefs are justified. A view about justifica-
tion which said that these beliefs couldn’t be justified
would be a view which had given into the skeptic.^ [3:
235]
The basics of thoughts concerning the future
If you are going to look at the epistemology of futures studies,
you will have to begin with the basics of epistemology, the
logical foundations. One of the basics in the theory of mind
and knowledge are the three laws of thought. The first law is
the law of identity, the second the law of non-contradiction
and the third the law of excluded middle [4, 5]. Regarding the
epistemology of futures studies, these three laws of thought
could affect the knowledge base of the discipline but should
first be described.
The law of identity states that everything that is has to be
identical with itself [4]. So if there is a red apple, the red apple
is a red apple and in this context nothing else (∀x (x = x)). This
law states basic logical truths about entities of all kind, and
knowledge referring to this axiomatic law can be considered
as elemental knowledge. The law of identity surely produces
tautologies; nevertheless is this kind of knowledge true
knowledge about entities of all kind. Knowledge that is
grounded on the first law of thought is not only true in the
present but also true in the past and the future.
The law of non-contradiction states that everything that is
cannot be itself and the opposite of itself at the same time [4].
So if there is a green apple, the green apple is a green apple
and cannot be a red apple at the same time (∀x ¬ (x ¬ x)). This
law also states basic logical truths about entities of all kind and
so knowledge referring to this axiomatic law can be consid-
ered as elemental knowledge. Of course the law of non-
contradiction produces tautologies, too. Nevertheless, this
kind of knowledge is also true knowledge about entities of
all kind. Knowledge that grounds on the second law of
thought is not only true in the present but also true in the past
and the future.
The law of excluded middle states that everything that is,
either is or is not, but nothing in between (∀x (x ¬x)) [4]. So if
there is an apple, it is either true or false that the apple is red. If
the apple is green, the sentence Bthe apple is red^ is false, if the
apple is indeed red, then the sentence Bthe apple is red^ is true
but there is no third option making the sentence Bthe apple is
red^ is something else than true or false. Or to give another
example, if there seems to be an apple on the table and this
apple is either there or is not there, but the apple has no third
undefined ontological status besides being or not being on the
table. In conjunction with the other two laws, this law states
basic logical truths about entities of all kind and, thus, knowl-
edge referring to this law can be considered as elemental
knowledge. Even the law of excluded middle produces tautol-
ogies. Nevertheless, this kind of knowledge is also true knowl-
edge about entities of all kind. Knowledge that grounds on the
third law of thought is not only true in the present but also true
in the past and the future.
The law of excluded middle is much more relevant to the
epistemology of futures studies than the first and the second
law of thought. Concerning the past, our knowledge is either
true or false and everyone would agree on that. Regarding
the future one could say that assumptions about the future
are neither true nor false because the future does not exist
yet and no one can decide whether an assumption is true or
false, so it is undefined. A main proponent of this view,
amongst others, is Aristotle [4, 6, 7]. Ariel Weissmann’s
view, however, is that it is an incident of incorrect speech.
If a sentence concerning the future of something is syntac-
tically correct, then the sentence is true or false. It is impor-
tant that there are no modal operators like Bmaybe^,
Bhopefully^ or Bwith God’s help^, because these would
make the sentences unclear and so, they could not be false
or true. Contrary, distinct modal operators like Bpossible^ or
Bprobable^ have to be used in such a manner that a sentence
can be true or false [4]. Thus, concerning the third law of
thought, there is no third ontological option for clearly
stated assumptions about the future.
Furthermore, Ariel Weissmann argues that the laws of
thought apply only to the realm of human reasoning, to
the Buniverse of discourse^ as he cites George Boole [4].
There might be a natural entity, as for example described
in the theory of quantum physics, that could adopt a third
status between to be or not to be, but it does not belong to
the realm of human reasoning. Moreover, the future is not
an external natural entity either, thus, the future and all
the assumptions about it belong to the realm of human
reasoning, where the laws of thought apply. Hence, as-
sumptions regarding the future have to be true or false
and cannot be undefined, tertium non datur [4]. The log-
ical foundation of epistemology implies the requirements
that are needed for an epistemological base for the disci-
pline of futures studies because assumptions regarding the
future have to be true or false. Thus, the mere possibility
of justified true beliefs about the future exists.
After it was shown that the foundation of epistemology
grants the mere possibility of justified true beliefs concerning
the future, another discourse needs to be looked at, that is, the
distinction between internalism and externalism.
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Externalism or internalism
When asking the question whether knowledge is justified by
an external source or by an internal source, the answers differ
significantly. If a person is an externalist, she believes that
justification is external and everyone can justify the knowl-
edge through an external source. If a person is an internalist,
she believes that justification is internal and everybody can
justify the knowledge through an internal source [2, 8–10].
This is a question about j-factors, which are the source of
justified true beliefs. J-factors are the reason for justification
and this justification of beliefs could be internal or external.
J-factors can be doxastic or propositional. Doxastic j-
factors are among others: beliefs, opinions, suspension of a
judgment, credence or convictions. Propositional j-factors are
altogether the content of a sentence like the subject, the prop-
osition and the time of the justification of a belief [2, 9–11].
Alvin I. Goldman tries to explain which conditions a j-factor
has to possess to be a proper j-factor: BX is a J-factor of a given
belief’s justificational status if and only if X helps explain why
the belief’s justificational status is what it is^ [9: 311].
For internalists, these j-factors are either accessible for re-
flection or are mental states. Because the reflection of j-factors
is internal and mental states have to be internal, too, all j-factors
of justified true beliefs could be explained with internalism.2
Externalists would deny that because they say that there are j-
factors that are not entirely internal. External j-factors could be
based on visual perception or other sensations which are not
mental states or accessible on reflection. These perceptions of
the external world are j-factors, which are not internal because a
person does not infer from her visual perception but has her
visual perception. On the one hand, we trust our perception in
our daily life to a large extent, and on the other hand a position
that denies our perception to be mostly true be a skeptical
position, which is not academically prolific [2, 10]. 3
As Alvin I. Goldman mentions [9], both externalism and
internalism are right about something concerning the justifi-
cation of beliefs, but concerning the epistemic foundation of
futures studies there is an important difference between them.
If we look at justified true beliefs about the future, we must
admit that there is no external entity, which a person could
perceptually refer to. Maybe externalism could be right about
present justified true beliefs, but externalism could not offer a
good explanation for future justified true beliefs.4 If this is
true, then with regard to an epistemic ground for futures stud-
ies, there is only internalism left when it comes to a potential
theory of epistemology. Thus, the two possible explanations
for internal justification of beliefs have to be described: the
explanation by accessibility and the explanation by mental
states.
Firstly, there is a way to explain the justification of beliefs
through accessibility of j-factors and the justification itself:
accessibility internalism [2]. As George Pappas suggests:
BIt requires only that one can become aware of the
knowledge basis, either by easy and quick reflection in
some cases, or by more difficult and lengthy reflection
in others. What matters, however, is not the temporal
length of the reflection, but rather that this is an aware-
ness one can achieve merely by reflection. And there is
something right about this, because we all engage in this
sort of activity all the time, often with good success.^
[10]
Secondly, there is a way to describe the justification of
beliefs through mental states because j-factors are mental
states. This approach is the mentalist internalism [2]. In the
words of Declan Smithies B[m]entalism in epistemology is the
thesis that one’s mental states determine one’s evidence and
hence which propositions one has justification to believe^
[12]. But this position towards justification is not unchal-
lenged [13].
To illustrate this, both approaches will be explained with an
example. If a person x is convinced that person y and z will be
at the training next Monday, then this belief is justified maybe
because person y celebrates her birthday after the training and
person x and z have to bring her present to the pitch or maybe
person x is justified to believe that person y and z will turn up,
since they show up every second Monday. Regarding the first
approach, person x can reflect on the justification of her belief
and she has access to it. She could remember that she bought
the present together with person z and that person y told them
last time, that she will bring drinks because of her birthday. So
x and z will bring the present to the training since person y will
be there, too. Thus, person x has a justified believe about the
future that person y and z will be at the training next Monday.
Concerning the second approach, there is person x and her
identical twin x*, who are both mentally identical. Person x
has been training in that team for the last 5 years, but her twin
x* only for the last week. Person x told her twin x* that person
y and z will be at the training next Monday, since they are
coming every secondMonday. Both x and x* are in some way
justified to believe that both person y and z will be at the
training. However, person x has a specific mental state regard-
ing her justification because she has experienced over the last
5 years that person y and z show up every secondMonday but
person x* lacks that mental state concerning her justification.
2 To follow Matthias Steup I will call them accessibility internalism and
mentalist internalism [2].
3 There is a long and interesting discussion between proponents of
internalism and proponents of externalism, but to describe more than
the shadowy lines of this discourse would go beyond the scope of this
paper.
4 The topic concerning justified true beliefs of the past is a likewise
interesting problem, but to address this, would go beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Therefore person x has, on the ground of her mental state, a
justified believe about the future that person y and z will be at
the training next Monday, which person x* has not.
Now the question concerning the epistemic base of futures
studies is, which kind of explanation of internal justification is
advantageous for the observation of justified true beliefs about
the future. There are two claims, which are crucial for these
explanations of justification. Firstly, the mind of every person
is cognitively luminous, which means, that a person knows
her mental states, respectively her j-factors for a justification
[2, 13] and secondly, axiomatic principles guide the reflection
of a person about her justification [2]. There are legitimate
doubts towards the luminosity or transparency of mental states
[13], which are doubted themselves [12]. But when it comes
to the possibility for a person to reflect her justification, there
is a necessity in certain principles that prevents this claim from
doubts. Of course, is going to continue but one can state that
the accessibility to reflect on the j-factors for certain justified
beliefs regarding the future is a promising way.
After this brief overview of the distinction between
internalism and externalism and the strategies of justification,
two epistemological theories concerning the structure of
knowledge should be discussed.
Foundationalism and coherentism
There are two theories of epistemology concerning the struc-
ture of knowledge that could be interesting for the epistemic
ground of futures studies: foundationalism and coherentism.
Of course a distinction is not unchallenged [14, 15]. However,
for a better understanding, foundationalism and coherentism
will be looked at separately.5 Knowledge, from the viewpoint
of foundationalism, could be seen as a building. A building
has a foundation and a superstructure that relates to basic
beliefs and nonbasic beliefs [2, 16]. In contrast, coherentism
could be pictured as a web of knowledge, where every knot
supports the other knots [2, 17]. Seven Ove Hansson, citing
Ernest Sosa, provides a slightly different picture:
BAccording to a classic formulation, coherentism means
that Ba body of knowledge is a free-floating raft every
plank of which helps directly or indirectly to keep all the
others in place, and no plank of which would retain its
status with no help from the others.^ In contrast,
foundationalism means that Bevery piece of knowledge
stands at the apex of a pyramid that rests on stable and
secure foundations whose stability and security does not
derive from the upper stories or sections.^ [15: 290]
Coherentism is an answer to the problem of solving the
regress problem which foundationalism offers, but this will
be discussed later [18]. Coherentism does not begin with basic
beliefs on which all other beliefs stand, but rather looks at all
beliefs because they are equally in need of justification. So a
belief could be justified since it is coherent with other beliefs
surrounding it. All the beliefs in one system together provide
the justification for each of the other beliefs because all com-
bined build a coherent system [2, 15, 17–19].
An example could be on the hockey field where person x, y
and z are playing a hockey game with their team. Suddenly
somebody claims that the sister of person x, person x*, com-
mitted a foul. The person is not that sure about the foul and
asks person x, y and z what they had witnessed regarding the
possible foul of person x*. Person y remembers that the ball
took an unforeseeable turn in another direction, person z be-
lieves that she heard the muffled noise of a ball hitting a shoe,
and person x only remembers that the hockey stick of person
x* was not on the ground, so she was not able to catch the ball
anyway. Altogether these beliefs are forming a coherent sys-
tem of a justified belief concerning the foul of person x*.
Michael Huemer concludes, that B… it would be unlikely
that unreliable witnesses would agree, says the coherentist;
therefore, the agreement of the witnesses is reason to think
their reports true^ [19, p. 338]. But there are a lot of problems
within coherentism, e.g., considerations of probability to-
wards the unreliable witnesses and their coherent answers,
which are not a big problem for weak coheretism but for a
strong coherentism [18, 19]. Nevertheless, concerning an epis-
temological theory of futures studies, it is not easy to work
with a coherentist approach. It is not plausible that one single
belief or a bunch of beliefs could justify one’s beliefs about the
future if they were all equally in need of justification. There-
fore, no belief is stable enough to justify any belief or a system
of beliefs about the future.6
Foundationalism on the other hand classifies beliefs in two
categories, in basic beliefs and non basic beliefs but even with
that distinction, coherence is still important: BFoundationalists
and coherentists, in short, do not differ over whether coher-
ence can be epistemically valuable. Where they differ is over
whether coherence alone can provide justification for belief,
or whether we must posit a privileged class of beliefs having
some individual credibility [19].^
Prior to exploring the concept of foundationalism, the dis-
tinction between basic and non-basic beliefs has to be looked
5 There is a long going discussion about foundationalism and
coherentism but to address this in every detail would go beyond the scope
of this paper.
6 Furthermore, there are two independent theories of epistemology with a
tendency to coherentism. Explanationism as a coherentist theory [2] is not
capable of explaining justified beliefs about the future either, as Ryan
Byerly explains, because there is not a best explanation for someone’s
evidence concerning future justified beliefs [3]. But neither is reliabilism
as a coherentist theory [2] capable of explaining why reliabilist knowl-
edge should make future true beliefs more likely, because of former jus-
tified beliefs [20, 21].
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at. A basic belief is a belief that does not need any further
justification through other beliefs. There are no beliefs needed
to justify a basic belief because this belief is analytically true,
like a tautology is true by virtue or could not be false since if it
were false, it would strongly violate basic human intuition [2,
17, 22–24]. And that is an unsatisfying solution to the regress
problem, as coherentists would mention. The regress problem
arises if there are no basic beliefs at all. This is because every
belief has to be justified by another belief and this belief has to
be justified by another belief, too. If there are no basic beliefs,
which do not need any further justification, this regress would
go on forever, respectively ad infinitum or in circular reasoning
[2, 7, 23]. Both alternatives are insufficient and thus, the regress
argument for foundationalism states that there have to be basic
and non-basic beliefs because neither an infinite regress nor
circular reasoning could be the ground of a justified belief.
From this follows that there are basic beliefs, because otherwise
there would be no possibility for justified beliefs at all. There is
a theory according to which an infinite regress of different
beliefs justifies knowledge: infinitism [25] but this position is
not unchallenged [23]. For the examination of the epistemic
foundations of futures studies John Turri’s point will be follow-
ed that argument for infinitism as stated by Peter Klein does not
enforce a preference over foundationalism [23].7
An exemplification of foundationalism could be a consider-
ation of person x towards her sister x*. Person x* is the twin
sister of x and so x believes, since she is a normal human being
with fears, hopes and wishes, that her sister for her part has
fears, hopes and wishes, too. According to that, person x could
be pretty sure about the fact that person x* will have fears,
hopes and wishes for the future, which is a properly justified
belief about the future. On that foundation, person x could act
to improve her sister’s wellbeing in the future, e.g., train her in
playing hockey. The important thing is that because she has a
basic belief about her sister having fears, hopes and wishes, she
could form a non-basic but justified belief about the future.
It seems that foundationalism could be a useful epistemic
foundation for futures studies because the distinction between
basic and non-basic beliefs embodies an important aspect.
Basic beliefs are necessary to found justified beliefs about
the future.
Conclusion
Previously, the laws of thought were investigated concerning
an epistemological ground for futures studies. Then, the dis-
tinction between internalism and externalism was looked at
and afterwards, as internalism seemed more promising, two
possible internal approaches to justify a belief were examined.
Thereafter, two different explanations for the structure of
knowledge were looked at: coherentism and foundationalism.
Regarding the epistemology of futures studies, there are
three important points. Firstly, the logical ground, the laws
of thought, grants the possibility of justified true beliefs about
the future as the third law states that unambiguous assump-
tions concerning the future can only be true or false but not
undefined. Secondly, regarding the distinction of internalism
and externalism, it is epistemically reasonable to favour
internalism over externalism because not only is it impossible
to refer to the future externally but the internal approach
concerning the accessibility of justification is a preferable
way to justify beliefs about the future. Thirdly, considering
the structure of knowledge foundationalism is a better choice
than coherentism as it is a robust answer to the regress prob-
lem. Moreover, a stable initial position is needed to justify
beliefs about the future.
This shows that there is a plausible and consistent way for
an epistemology of futures studies that could not only be help-
ful for considerations regarding the future but that is also im-
portant for the scientific discipline of futures studies to devel-
op a likewise consistent and plausible theoretical foundation.
Certainly, this paper can only be one part of it but there are
many more aspects of futures studies worthy to be investigat-
ed, e.g., something the philosophy of mind is looking at: our
ability to form counterfactual conditional. This ability to
imagine multiple alternative developments of situations could
be a theoretical ground of the scenario method, which could
be further examined in the future.
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